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Boston Police Department (BPD) officers have 
engaged in widespread racially biased “stop-and-
frisk” practices, according to a preliminary statistical 
analysis of four years of BPD police-civilian encounter 
reports. The findings confirm what many people from 
communities of color have long suspected: Boston 
police officers targeted people of color at far greater 
rates than white people.
In 2010, the BPD secured a researcher to analyze 
more than 204,000 BPD reports of police-civilian 
encounters from 2007 to 2010. These reports, known 
as “Field Interrogation, Observation, Frisk and/or 
Search”—or “FIOFS Reports,” are made when an offi-
cer records having interrogated, observed, stopped, 
frisked, or searched someone. The researcher’s 
preliminary analysis of these FIOFS Reports found 
evidence that Black Bostonians are more likely to be 
selected for these encounters than otherwise identi-
cal white Bostonians.
Most alarmingly, the analysis found that Blacks 
were subjected to 63% of these encounters, even 
though they made up just 24% of Boston’s popula-
tion. The analysis also showed that crime—whether 
measured by neighborhood crime rates or the arrest 
records or alleged gang involvement of the civilians 
subjected to these encounters—does not explain 
away this racial disparity. 
Instead, even after controlling for crime, alleged 
gang affiliation, and other non-race factors, the 
number of police-civilian encounters was driven by 
a neighborhood’s concentration of Black residents: 
as the Black population increased as a percentage 
of the total population, so did the number of police 
encounters. The analysis also found, after controlling 
for alleged gang involvement and prior arrest records, 
that Blacks were more likely to experience repeat po-
lice encounters and to be frisked or searched during 
an encounter. 
This preliminary analysis—which has been shared 
with the BPD, the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, and the national ACLU—suggests 
that thousands of Black Bostonians were observed, 
stopped, interrogated, frisked, or searched because of 
their race. Key preliminary findings, all of which con-
trol for non-race factors, include the following:
• Young Black men were more likely than young 
white men to be targeted for police-civilian en-
counters such as stops, frisks, searches, observa-
tions, and interrogations.
• When police-civilian encounters occurred, 
young Black men were more likely than young 
white men to be frisked or searched.
• Young Black men were more likely to be tar-
geted for repeat police-civilian encounters.
The preliminary findings make clear that the BPD 
has practiced racially discriminatory policing. This 
practice contradicts the principle of equal protection 
under the law, which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Articles 1, 
10, and 106 of the Massachusetts Constitution.
The data also show that, for Bostonians of all rac-
es, the BPD has failed to ensure that police-civilian 
encounters comply with constitutional protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under 
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
police stops are unlawful unless supported by indi-
vidualized  reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and 
frisks require individualized reasonable suspicion that 
a person is armed and dangerous. The data, however, 
show that BPD officers have largely failed to justify 
their police-civilian encounters with individualized 
suspicion.
Instead, in three-quarters of all FIOFS Reports from 
2007-2010, the officer’s stated reason for initiating 
the encounter was simply “investigate person.” But 
“investigate person” cannot provide a constitutionally 
permissible reason for stopping or frisking someone. 
It only describes what the officer decided to do.
Finally, the BPD seems unable to prove that its 
stop-and-frisk tactics were effective in fighting crime. 
According to BPD officials, officers did not file FIOFS 
Reports when encounters resulted in arrest. And, for 
the 204,000-plus FIOFS Reports that were completed, 
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only 2.5% indicate that an officer seized weapons, 
drugs, or other contraband. Despite ACLU requests, 
the BPD has not disclosed any information showing 
that it has eradicated racially biased policing, or that it 
now ensures that its stops and frisks are justified.
The ACLU applauds the BPD for making FIOFS data 
available to independent researchers, and for permit-
ting the researchers to share their preliminary analy-
sis with our organization, and thereby policy-makers 
and the public. These disclosures mark an enormous 
step forward; they present the police, elected offi-
cials, and the people of Boston with clear evidence 
that it is time for the BPD to adopt a new, more effec-
tive, and more equitable approach. 
We welcome the opportunity to use this new infor-
mation to work with Boston city leaders, the BPD, and 
people from affected communities. Together, we can 
enhance public safety by reducing racial bias in polic-
ing and by building trust between Boston communi-
ties and the officers who swear an oath to protect and 
serve them. These are our key recommendations to 
the Mayor and the BPD:
• Require all officers who engage in police-civil-
ian encounters—including interrogations, stops, 
frisks, and searches—to use body-worn cameras 
during every interaction with the public. Also re-
quire written or video-recorded consent whenev-
er an officer claims that such an encounter was 
consensual.
• Provide documentation—i.e., a receipt—to 
any civilian involved in an interrogation, stop, 
frisk, or search, whether or not it was consensu-
al.
• Publish electronic data on a quarterly basis 
about all stops, frisks, non-consensual searches, 
observations, and consensual interrogations and 
searches, including a breakdown by race, gen-
der, age, outcome, and the officer’s basis for the 
encounter and action.
• Adopt a bias-free policing policy that address-
es obstacles to race-neutral policing—including 
implicit bias—and revise, provide training on, 
and regularly publish BPD policies and depart-
ment directives on stops, frisks, searches, and 
consent.
I. INTRODUCTION: IVAN’S STORY
Ivan Richiez, a young Black Dominican-American, 
was robbed at gunpoint in the summer of 2011. Two 
young men took his wallet and cell phone. One of 
them pistol-whipped Ivan, smashing his mouth.
Ivan then slowly walked home, down Washington 
Street and right by 
the District E-13 Po-
lice Station in Bos-




ied and battered, 
he thought of the 
role that police 
officers had played 
in his life. 
Ivan grew up in the South Street housing projects 
of Jamaica Plain. His friends and neighbors came from 
Boston’s communities of color: Puerto Ricans, Domin-
icans, African-Americans, Haitians and others—some 
citizens and some immigrants. For them, the police 
were a daily presence.
Ivan experienced his first stop and frisk on a warm 
fall evening in 2007, when he was 14 years old. He 
was sitting with some friends on the benches across 
from his apartment building. A Boston police car, a 
“blue and white,” rolled into the South Street parking 
lot. Two uniformed officers, both white, jumped out 
and confronted Ivan and his friends:
“Who are you guys?”
“What are you doing here?”
“Where do you live?”
“What gang are you in?”
The officers then frisked Ivan. They grabbed at his 
legs, his arms, his torso. One officer reached into 
Ivan’s pockets. But they found nothing on Ivan or his 
friends.
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Ivan describes this treatment as rough, abusive, and 
lacking any respect. He says that this is common, for 
himself and his friends. When asked how many times 
he has been subjected to stops and frisks, Ivan says,
“Many times . . . thirty to forty times. Maybe fif-
ty.”
The night Ivan was robbed, he walked past the 
police station. In his mind, he says, he paused. He 
thought, “Should I go inside? Should I tell the cops . . . 
that I was just robbed at gunpoint?” 
He never told the police. He never reported the 
crime. As a result, the people who robbed him were 
never caught. Ivan says “What would [the police] have 
done for me? I don’t trust them after the way they 
have treated me and my people for so many years.”
II. POLICING IN BOSTON: FROM “SEARCH 
ON SIGHT” TO “GETTING POSTED”
The City of Boston has a checkered racial past, and 
the BPD is no stranger to it. In the late 1980s, the BPD 
applied a policy of “Search on Sight” to anyone al-
legedly “associated with a gang” in Boston’s predomi-
nantly-Black Roxbury neighborhood. This practice sub-
jected people to humiliating searches based on where 
they lived and the color of their skin. As a Superior 
Court judge recognized, illegal 
searches in Roxbury were not 
just tolerated by the BPD; they 
were “applauded.”
Thankfully, the BPD aban-
doned Search on Sight by the 
early 1990s. But stories like 
Ivan’s are common. These 
stories suggest, and a prelim-
inary statistical analysis now shows, that the BPD still 
disproportionately targets Black men for stops, frisks, 
and searches—even when controlling for the alleged 
gang affiliation and past criminal histories of people 
subject to these encounters.
Similar experiences in other cities, from New York 
City to Newark to Los Angeles, reflect this trend: 
police departments have pledged to “get tough” on 
crime by targeting “high-crime” areas. But instead, 
police officers have gotten tough on people of color 
by conducting high numbers of humiliating and stig-
matizing stops, frisks, and searches in their neighbor-
hoods.
This is the problem that has become known as Stop 
and Frisk.
The United States Supreme Court first authorized 
the law enforcement technique of “stop and frisk” in 
Terry v. Ohio, a 1968 case involving a group of men 
who were casing a jewelry store for a robbery. The 
Court permitted police officers to conduct investigato-
ry stops and protective frisks to protect officer safety 
and to investigate possible crimes. But a stop or frisk 
cannot be based on a mere hunch, and it cannot rely 
at all on real or perceived race, ethnicity or national 
origin: 
• To “stop” someone, a police officer must have 
individualized and objective reasonable suspicion 
that the person has committed, is committing, or 
is about to commit a crime.
• To “frisk” someone, which is a pat-down of 
a person’s outer clothing, an officer must have 
reasonable suspicion that a lawfully stopped 
person is armed and dangerous. A frisk is not a 
full-blown search for evidence; it may be used 
only to seek weapons.
BPD officers are supposed to 
complete “2487 Forms” following 
encounters with civilians. From 2007 
to 2010, the forms were called “Field 
Interrogation, Observation, Frisk, 
and/or Search” or “FIOFS” Reports 
(though, as of 2011, they were 
renamed “Field Interaction/Observa-
tion/Encounter” or “FIOE” Reports). At the time, BPD 
Rule 323 required officers to complete these reports 
after “observ[ing], detain[ing], or interrogat[ing] a 
person suspected of unlawful design,” after “frisk[ing] 
or search[ing] an individual during a stop,” and after 
searching vehicles.
BPD officers refer to these encounters as “FIOs.” But 
The bottom line: the 
BPD unfairly targets 
Black people because 
of their race.
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on the streets of Boston, it’s called “getting posted.”
While anecdotal evidence of racial profiling is easy 
to find, and a 2004 Northeastern University study 
found evidence of racial bias in BPD traffic stops, the 
public has never been shown empirical data about 
street encounters between Boston police officers and 
pedestrians. In March 2014, however, researchers 
presented to the BPD and the ACLU a preliminary 
analysis of data from over 204,000 FIOFS Reports 
of police-civilian encounters that occurred between 
2007 and 2010.
The analysis is clear: from 2007 to 
2010, Boston had a serious stop-and-
frisk problem. This problem included a 
pattern of racially targeted, police-civil-
ian encounters and a practice of failing 
to ensure that stops and frisks were 
justified.
HISTORY OF THE BOSTON 
STREET-ENCOUNTER STUDY
This report is part of the ACLU of 
Massachusetts’s “Justice for All” ini-
tiative. In recent years, the ACLU of 
Massachusetts has received reports 
that Boston Police Department officers 
are unfairly targeting people of color 
for stops and frisks. Together with the 
national ACLU’s Racial Justice Program, 
and with legal counsel from the law 
firm WilmerHale, we have sought to ex-
amine the BPD’s stop-and-frisk policies 
and practices. 
In June 2009, the ACLU of Massachu-
setts wrote the BPD to propose a study 
of police-civilian encounters. We re-
quested access to FIOFS data and urged 
the BPD to “assess the significance of 
race as a factor in stop[s] and search-
es.” We also asked the BPD whether 
FIOFS Reports were being used primar-
ily to gather intelligence on civilians, 
rather than to oversee officers. 
We were then told that we would 
be charged $112,000 simply to obtain redacted FIOFS 
Reports from 2007-2009. Unable to pay that amount, 
we considered other means—including litigation—of 
making these vital public records available to policy-
makers and the public.
But instead of going to court, in 2010 the ACLU of 
Massachusetts reached an agreement with the BPD. 
The agreement provided that then-BPD Policy Advisor 








Blacks accounted for more than 3 out of 5 FIOFS (Field Interrogation, Observation, Frisk and/or 
Search) in 2007-2010 but represent less than 1 of 4 people in Boston.
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Justice at Rutgers University, would 
work with the BPD to “code” the 
FIOFS Reports into an analyzable 
form. Dr. Braga agreed that he 
would then consult with indepen-
dent scholars, including one sug-
gested by the ACLU of Massachu-
setts, to analyze the data.
The stated research goal was to 
study: (1) the extent to which police 
officers documented stops, frisks, 
and searches in FIOFS Reports; (2) 
the nature and scope of any su-
pervisory review of these reports; 
(3) the impact, if any, of race on 
decisions to stop or search; and (4) 
the incidence of stops and searches 
at different times and locations in 
Boston. Dr. Braga predicted that the 
study would be completed by the 
summer of 2012. 
However, the study is still ongo-
ing as of the date of this report, 
and the BPD has not disclosed any 
of the underlying data. Instead, on 
two occasions, some of the data 
has been described. 
First, in June 2012, Dr. Braga 
told the BPD and the ACLU of 
Massachusetts that the proportion of FIOFS Reports 
involving Black subjects (63.3%) far exceeded the 
proportion of Black residents in Boston (24.4%). Later, 
in March 2014, Dr. Braga presented a preliminary 
analysis of the FIOFS Reports to the BPD, the ACLU 
of Massachusetts, the ACLU, and WilmerHale. He 
revealed racial disparities that persisted even after 
controlling for crime and other non-race factors, and 
he said that a full written analysis would be complet-
ed by June 2014.  
The analysis is not yet complete. However, we have 
no reason to believe that the final analysis will con-
tradict the key preliminary findings presented in June 
2012 and March 2014. 
This report addresses those key findings, while 
understanding that new information may still come 
to light. The preliminary findings, combined with 
discussions we have held with community members, 
leaders, and activists—some of whom are pictured 
above—make clear that now is the time for a mean-
ingful public conversation about reforming stop-and-
frisk practices in Boston.
III. RACIAL BIAS IN THE BPD’S STOP-
AND-FRISK PRACTICES
When police officers use race as a factor in stop-
ping or frisking people, they engage in racial profiling 
1  FIOFS Reports are not limited to stops and frisks; they also 
document interrogations, searches, and mere observations. In 
March 2014, BPD officials acknowledged that officers might have 
failed to comply uniformly with the rule that they report all stops 
and frisks in FIOFS Reports from 2007 to 2010, and they continue 
to fail to do so. Nevertheless, FIOFS Reports provide the best data 
about stops and frisks in Boston.
2  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013), appeal dismissed (Sept. 25, 2013). 
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prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Articles 1, 10, and 106 of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution. Preliminary analysis of 204,739 
FIOFS Reports confirms what many in Boston’s com-
munities of color have long suspected: the BPD has 
not only stopped, frisked, observed, and searched 
them at far greater rates than whites; it has targeted 
thousands of Black people for these encounters at 
least in part because of their race.1
A. THE BPD’S FIOFS REPORTS REFLECT 
WIDESPREAD TARGETING OF BLACKS
Nearly two-thirds of BPD police-civilian encoun-
ters target Black Bostonians. While the 2010 cen-
sus reveals that Blacks made up 24.4% of Boston’s 
population, they comprised 63.3% of police-civilian 
encounters from 2007 to 2010—well over double the 
rate suggested by population figures. Over a four-year 
period, Black Bostonians were subjected to roughly 
129,600 of the 204,739 recorded police-civilian en-
counters.
The BPD’s practices between 2007 and 2010 were 
arguably even more racially skewed than the New 
York City Police Department’s (NYPD) tactics ruled un-
constitutional in 2013 by a federal court. Boston and 
New York City have comparable Black populations; the 
2010 census found that 24.4% of Bostonians and 23% 
of New Yorkers were Black. However, Blacks account-
ed for 52% of NYPD stops between 2004 and 2012—a 
shocking figure, but still far lower than the 63.3% of 
BPD encounters that targeted Blacks.2
B. RACIAL BIAS PERSISTS EVEN AFTER 
ACCOUNTING FOR CRIME
The research team has studied whether factors 
other than race explain why, from 2007 to 2010, the 
BPD targeted Blacks for nearly two-thirds of all po-
lice-civilian encounters. Was it simply because Blacks 
are more likely than whites to commit crimes or live 
in rough neighborhoods? 
The answer, it turns out, is no.
STOP AND FRISK IN BOSTON’S  
LATINO COMMUNITIES
Why does this report focus on the impact of the 
BPD’s stop-and-frisk tactics on Black Bostonians, 
rather than both Blacks and Latinos?
The answer relates to the BPD’s core data prob-
lems. The BPD’s data likely reflects an under-identi-
fication of Latinos. When reporting a police-civilian 
encounter, officers must identify the subject as 
American Indian, Asian, Black, Hispanic, or white. 
These limited categories fail to capture the com-
plexity of the Latino community, where often racial 
and ethnic categories are not mutually exclusive. 
Officers may incorrectly report a Latino to be 
“white.” And like Ivan, some people in Boston’s 
Latino communities identify by both their race and 
ethnicity. 
The likely under-reporting of police encounters 
with Latinos makes it difficult to assess the impact 
of the BPD’s stop-and-frisk practices on Latinos.
But the preliminary analysis did find that a neigh-
borhood’s concentration of “Hispanic” residents, 
like the concentration of Black residents, drives 
increased BPD encounters. The BPD’s stop-and-
frisk practices should be reformed to address this 
problem. 
Thus, in formulating recommendations below, 
we propose reforms that would benefit all commu-
nities of color. We also call upon the BPD to revise 
FIOFS Report forms to accommodate more com-
plex racial and ethnic designations, and to imple-
ment precinct-level cultural competency training 
in the histories and cultures of local immigrant and 
ethnic communities.
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The research team conducted several analyses to 
measure the effect of race on these encounters. Their 
preliminary findings confirm that Blacks were more 
likely to experience both stops and searches—even 
after controlling for non-race factors such as neigh-
borhood crime rates or the past arrest records and 
alleged gang affiliation of the civilians subjected to 
police encounters. 
These preliminary findings include the following 
evidence of race-based policing:
• Black race is a significant factor driving BPD 
police-civilian encounters.
The research team determined that a neighbor-
hood’s concentration of Black residents drives the rate 
of police-civilian encounters. 
What does this mean? It means that given two 
otherwise identical Boston neighborhoods—with 
identical crime rates and total populations—BPD 
initiated more street encounters in the neighborhood 
with more Black residents. Between 2007 and 2010, 
the mere presence of 
Black residents increased 
the numbers of police-ci-
vilian encounters. And 
higher concentrations of 
Black residents yielded 
even more police-civilian 
encounters (see chart 
on page 8). This finding 
provides important—and 
disturbing—evidence that 
race drove, at least in part, 
BPD encounters. 
• A person’s Black race 
substantially increases the 
likelihood that the BPD will 
target him for more than 
one encounter. 
The research team also 
reported that, among 
people who experienced 
police encounters, Blacks 
were more likely to be 
targeted for multiple en-
counters.
What does this mean? It 
means that, once targeted 
for an encounter, a Black 
person was at a higher 
risk than an otherwise 
identical white person of 
being targeted again. The 
researchers found that 
	  
63%	  “Black”	  	  
75%	  Investigate	  
Person	  
Only	  2.5%	  of	  the	  
police-­‐civilian	  
encounters	  studied	  
were	  reported	  to	  
involve	  the	  seizure	  
of	  items.	  	  BPD	  has	  
not	  shown	  that	  any	  
of	  the	  200K+	  
encounters	  resulted	  
in	  arrest.	  
Approximate Relationship between the Percentage of
Black Residents and the Predicted Number of Police-Civilian 
Encounters in Boston Neighborhoods
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aclum.org/stopandfrisk









Black, Brown and Targeted
9
ACLU
although prior arrest history and gang membership 
also increased a person’s chance of being targeted for 
a repeat police-civilian encounter, those factors did 
not explain away the role of Black race. Thus, Blacks 
targeted for police-civilian encounters are more likely 
to experience not just one, but repeat police-civilian 
encounters because of their race.
• A person’s Black race substantially increases 
the likelihood that the BPD will target him for a 
frisk or search. 
The research team also reported that among Blacks 
and whites who experienced police encounters, 
Blacks were more likely than whites to be frisked or 
searched.  
What does this mean? It means that, if a Black 
person and an otherwise identical white person were 
each targeted for an encounter, the Black person 
was at a higher risk of having the police elevate the 
encounter to a physical frisk or search. Once again, 
the researchers controlled for a person’s prior arrest 
history, alleged gang membership, and other factors. 
Thus, after the start of a police-civilian encounter, 
Blacks were more likely to be 
frisked or searched because of 
their race. 
The bottom line: the BPD 
unfairly targets Black people 
because of their race, separate 
and apart from efforts to target 
neighborhoods or people associ-
ated with crime.
C. IF ANYTHING, THESE 
FINDINGS UNDERESTIMATE 
BOSTON’S PROBLEM OF 
RACIALLY BIASED POLICING
The preliminary research might 
actually underestimate the role 
of racial bias in the BPD’s policing 
practices. Why? In assessing the 
role of crime in driving police-ci-
vilian encounters, the research 
team relied on the BPD’s own 
data and reporting practices. For 
three reasons, those practices 
might undercount the number of 
Blacks who were targeted be-
cause of their race. 
• BPD records appear to omit 
some encounters with people 
who lack arrest records or gang 
affiliations.
BPD rules require an officer to 



























Observation, Frisk and/or 
Search)
Neighborhood Disparities: Boston Police-Civilian Encounters 
from 2007 – 2010, in the Three Most-Targeted and Three 
Least-Targeted Districts
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the officer stopped some-
one who had no arrest re-
cord, gang affiliation, drugs, 
or weapons. But Bostonians 
report that this does not 
always happen.
Ivan is one of those 
Bostonians. He has been 
stopped and frisked many 
times, but the officers often 
did not even take down his 
name, much less fill out a 
FIOFS Report. As a result, 
FIOFS Reports may well 
underestimate the number 
of police-civilian encounters 
that involved people of col-
or unaffiliated with gangs or 
lacking prior arrest records.
• BPD records may 
overstate the involve-
ment of Black people in 
gangs. 
The BPD collects and 
retains the names of al-
leged gang members in a 
BPD gang database, but has 
declined to reveal how it 
decides whether to include 
or remove a name from the 
list. As Ivan’s experience 
demonstrates, young Black men can be labeled gang 
members even when they are not. And there is no 
way for them to correct that error.
• A person’s prior arrest record, by itself, cannot 
justify a stop or frisk.
A person’s arrest record reflects past conduct; it 
does not justify stopping and frisking that person 
whenever the police want. In fact, BPD officials have 
conceded that none of the encounters described in 
the FIOFS Reports involved an arrest. Whatever the 
subjects of these Reports did in the past, they were 
evidently not committing crimes when the police initi-
ated these encounters.
And prior arrests might have been due to racially 
biased policing. For example, the FBI Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program shows that, in 2010, Black peo-
ple in Suffolk County were 4.8 times more likely than 
whites to be arrested for marijuana possession, even 
though studies confirm that Blacks and whites use 
marijuana at roughly the same rates.3


















Reasons for Interrogation Observation, Frisk, or Search from 2007 – 2010




3  ACLU, The War on Marijuana in Black and White, 156; see 
Results from the 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: 
Detailed Tables, Table 1.24B (Marijuana Use in Lifetime, Past Year, 
and Past Month among Persons Aged 12 or Older, by Demographic 
Characteristics: Percentages, 2010 and 2011) (2012), available 
here.
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IV. THE BPD’S 
INABILITY TO SHOW 






The Fourth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution and Ar-
ticle 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights prohibit 
unreasonable intrusions on 
our bodies and possessions by 
the government. The prelimi-
nary analysis of 204,739 FIOFS 
Reports demonstrates that the 
BPD has not ensured compli-
ance with this prohibition. 
A. BPD OFFICERS HAVE NOT 
PROVIDED LEGITIMATE 
REASONS FOR STOPS, 
FRISKS, AND SEARCHES
In 75% of all FIOFS Reports, 
BPD officers cited “investigate 
person” as the reason for 
the interrogation, observa-
tion, frisk, or search. But that 
phrase merely indicates that 
the patrol officer initiated a 
stop, frisk, or search. It cannot 
explain, either to the public or to a BPD supervisor, 
why the officer did so.
The U.S. and Massachusetts Constitutions require 
more than that. Officers must have legitimate reasons 
for initiating stops and frisks. To initiate a stop, an 
officer must have reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity. To conduct a frisk, the officer must 
have reasonable articulable suspicion that the individ-
ual is armed and dangerous.
Under these standards, an “investigate person” 
rationale cannot justify a single stop or frisk. It is no 
different from writing, “Because I said so.”
In fact, “investigate person” is worse than the 
“furtive movement” rationale that was used by NYPD 
officers in 51.3% of their stops and frisks. A federal 
court ruled that “furtive movement” is so vague that 
it fails to justify a stop or frisk, without more specific 
information.4
Yet the “furtive movement” rationale at least at-
tempts to explain what someone did to attract suspi-
cion; the “investigate person” rationale does not. 
suspicion or hunch: a feeling or guess based on 
intuition rather than facts
reasonable suspicion of crime: some specic and 
articulable facts that a person is involved in crime
reasonable suspicion armed and dangerous: some 
specic and articulable facts that a person is armed 
with a weapon and is dangerous
probable cause: enough information to reasonably 
believe the person has committed a crime
consent stop: Police can always stop you if you agree 
to be stopped. Therefore ask the police, "Am I free to 
leave?"
stop: a brief detention. Police can hold you for a 
reasonable amount of time
frisk: a pat down to the outer clothing to search for 
weapons only
search: more extensive than a frisk. Police can look in 
pockets , bags and containers for evidence of the 
alleged crime
arrest: A person is taken into police custody based on 
evidence of a crime






You are free to leave
Ask “Am I being detained?”
Ask “Am I under arrest?” 
and “What’s the charge?”
If yes, you are not free to leave











You are free to leave
Make a consensual stop
Ask “Am I being detained?”










At dierent steps governing police-pedestrian encounters, police have dierent rights, and so do you.
denotes what you can do
denotes what police can do





4  Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
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Because the “investigate 
person” rationale is both so 
pervasive and so deficient, 
the BPD cannot determine 
whether its officers regularly 
stopped and frisked people 
for good reasons or bad. Thus, 
this rationale undermines 
supervision, enabling BPD of-
ficers to avoid both individual 
and collective accountability 
to the Department, the peo-
ple, and the communities that 
they are supposed to protect 
and serve.
B. THE BPD HAS NOT 
SHOWN THAT ITS STOPS 
AND FRISKS PRODUCED 
RESULTS
Beyond being unable to 
prove that it has complied 
with constitutional guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the BPD cannot show that its 
stop-and-frisk practices helped to fight crime. BPD 
officials have acknowledged to the ACLU that, despite 
a rule requiring officers to complete FIOFS Reports for 
every encounter, officers did not complete Reports 
for anyone who was arrested. Because it did not track 
the entire universe of stops and frisks—i.e., those that 
led to arrest and those that did not—the BPD cannot 
say what proportion of stops and frisks resulted in 
arrest.
But the FIOFS Reports do reveal certain facts. They 
show that, in a four-year span, the BPD targeted 
Blacks for roughly 129,600 encounters—63.3% of 
204,739—that did not result in arrest. 
Moreover, only 2.5% of the FIOFS Reports involved 
the seizure of contraband or a weapon. So tens of 
thousands of Black Bostonians were subjected to 
these encounters despite not being engaged in con-
duct that a BPD officer deemed worthy of an arrest.
V. THE EFFECT OF BIASED POLICING ON 
PEOPLE OF COLOR AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Policing based on bias and negative stereotypes not 
only undermines civil liberties, it imperils public safe-
ty. The harms caused by biased policing have become 
apparent in interviews and community meetings that 
the ACLU of Massachusetts has had with Bostonians 
of color over the last several months and years. These 
discussions, some of which are described below, 
demonstrate that people feel hurt by, and fearful of, 
the police.
That is hardly surprising. Protests swept the na-
tion in August 2014 following the killing of unarmed 
teenager Michael Brown by a police officer in Fer-
guson, Missouri. In Ferguson, traffic stop data show 
that police disproportionately target Blacks for stops 
and searches. Communities of color nationwide have 
pointed to Ferguson as an example of the counterpro-
ductive, stigmatizing, and sometimes dangerous ef-
fect of unfairly targeting Blacks for police action. As a 












Boston Police Street-Encounter “Hit” Rate from 2007 – 2010
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5 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 557. 
6. Charles M. Blow, The Whole System Failed Trayvon Martin, N.Y. 
Times (July 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/
opinion/the-whole-system-failed.html
stop-and-frisk program, “While 
it is true that any one stop is a 
limited intrusion in duration and 
deprivation of liberty, each stop 
is also a demeaning and humili-
ating experience. No one should 
live in fear of being stopped 
whenever he leaves his home to 
go about activities of daily life.”5
These words are just as true 
for Boston as they are for New 
York. When police officers engage in racially biased 
actions, they undermine the vital trust between po-
lice and the public that is necessary to ensure public 
safety. As New York Times columnist Charles M. Blow 
has said, fighting crime by treating young Black peo-
ple with “universal suspicion” is “like burning down a 
house to rid it of mice.”6
A. IMPROPER STOP-AND-FRISK TACTICS HARM 
BLACK BOSTONIANS
In interviews and community meetings, young Black 
Bostonians report feeling scared while walking home 
or to school because of how the Boston police target 
and harass them. One young man stated that he does 
not know why the police regularly stop him when he 
is not doing anything, and that the police’s behavior 
toward him and his friends “make people build a type 
of hatred toward them.” In his view, “We get stopped 
all the time, but people in the South End get treated 
differently.” 
Another young man noted, “Police think badges 
give them the power to do whatever they want.” 
Similarly, Armani W.  explained that no matter what 
he does, how he dresses, or where he goes, he always 
feels that the police are targeting him. Armani stated, 
“I’m walking down the street trying to mind my own 
business and I get stopped. I look like college, but I’m 
still getting stopped. I’m in the 
newspaper as a neighborhood 
scholar, and I’m still getting 
stopped. I can’t ride my bike 
down the street to the corner 
store without worrying that 
I’ll end up in the back of a cop 
car.”
The BPD’s targeting of Black 
men and youth for police 
encounters has caused many 
in Boston’s Black communities to feel as though they 
are living under siege. The BPD’s stop-and-frisk tac-
tics pervade every aspect of daily life, leaving people 
to feel as though they are criminals and constantly 
suspect. As one young man explained, “Being stopped 
affects your sense of home and the image being pro-
jected about you. [Stop-and-frisk] marks you and the 
people who look like you as criminals.”
B. IMPROPER STOP-AND-FRISK TACTICS ERODE 
TRUST WITH COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
When people are stopped without any reason, or 
when they hear that the “reason” is reported as “in-
vestigate person,” they begin to believe that the sys-
tem is not treating them fairly. And, of course, they’re 
right. These experiences inevitably reduce trust and 
faith in the police. 
One young woman, Yohana B., put the problem 
this way: “Unless you’re white, this is not a system to 
protect you. It is not about the rights written down, 
it’s about what happens.”
Many of Boston’s young men of color believe that 
when officers look at them, they see only one thing: 
criminals. Alex P-C., a resident of Boston’s predom-
inantly-Black Roxbury neighborhood, stated, “Stop 
and frisk really changes how you act; like it really gets 
to you. It makes you feel like you’re a criminal when 
you’re not even doing anything wrong.” 
When the BPD targets Mattapan, Roxbury, and 
Dorchester for stops just because of their high con-
centration of Black residents, communities of color 
can feel that they are under occupation.
I can’t ride my bike 
down the street to the 
corner store without 
worrying that I’ll end up 
in the back of a cop car.” 
—Armani W.
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Young Bostonians sometimes alter entirely legal 
behavior just to avoid the police. They do not go to 
parks and playgrounds, basketball courts and baseball 
diamonds. They avoid train stations and bus stops, 
city squares and community festivals. 
And, perhaps most worryingly, they avoid the po-
lice. Ivan Richiez’s story suggests that victims of crime 
are less likely to report it if 
they have personally expe-
rienced racially biased po-
licing. That makes all of us 
much less safe in our com-
munities, in our homes, 
and on our streets.
Lastly, by  selecting Black 
people for the majority 
of more than 204,000 
police encounters over 
four years, the BPD has effectively told Black children 
that we are preparing them to enter a pipeline. That 
pipeline starts in school, moves to stops and frisks on 
the streets, and ends with jails and prisons. Stop and 
Frisk creates a culture that tells our youth, “The place 
for you is behind bars.”
Martsyl Joseph, a criminal defense attorney in Bos-
ton, explains, “[Stop and Frisk] happens so much that 
kids internalize the view that police have of them—
that they are criminals. Among many of the youth 
with whom I work, being targeted by the police be-
cause of the color of their skin has become ‘normal.’ 
Kids know that even if they’re not doing anything 
wrong, the police are going to stop them. To Black and 
Latino kids, that’s just how it goes.” 
Joseph further notes that “with racially discrimina-
tory policing being the norm, you have large groups 
of youth who do not trust the police and who do not 
want to cooperate with the police. You cannot have 
productive community policing so long as you keep 
treating all young Black and Latino people like crimi-
nals.”
VI. TIME TO ACT: BRINGING 
ACCOUNTABILITY, CONSTITUTIONALITY 
AND TRANSPARENCY TO BOSTON STOP-
AND-FRISK PRACTICES 
The preliminary analysis of FIOFS Reports from 2007 
to 2010 identifies a serious stop-and-frisk problem, 
with two major dimensions: (1) racially biased po-
licing, including the 
targeting of Black 
neighborhoods for po-
lice-civilian encounters 
and of Black people for 
repeat police-civilian 
encounters as well as 
frisks and searches; and 
(2) a failure to ensure 
that the BPD’s practic-
es complied with constitutional prohibitions against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.
How did this happen? And how do we end these 
practices?
A. BPD POLICIES ARE INADEQUATE7
The BPD’s deficient practices from 2007 to 2010 
appear to reflect deficient policies. The BPD has 
disclosed five policies and training materials from this 
period, which address stops, frisks, and searches, as 
well as procedures for completing FIOFS Reports and 
entering information about civilians into law enforce-
ment databases. None of those materials prohibit 
racially biased policing or instruct BPD officers on 
how to ensure that stops, frisks, and searches are not 
based to any extent on race, ethnicity, or national 
origin, as the law requires.
Nor does it appear that the BPD has imposed signif-
icant reforms since hearing, in June 2012 and March 
2014, about racial disparities in its police-civilian en-
counters. The ACLU has asked the BPD to make avail-
able all recent policies and training materials on racial 
“Being stopped affects your sense 
of home and the image being 
projected about you. [Stop-and-
frisk] marks you and the people 
who look like you as criminals.”
7 The policies and training materials discussed in this section are 
available at https://www.aclum.org/stopandfrisk/policies_and_
training.pdf
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profiling and Stop and Frisk, as well as recent data on 
stop-and-frisk practices. In response, the BPD has in-
dicated that it intends to move away from permitting 
officers to use “investigate person” as a justification 
for an encounter. But the BPD has not provided any 
post-2010 policies, training materials, or data geared 
toward addressing problems with racially biased polic-
ing or unjustified stops, frisks, and searches.
Instead, the BPD has produced 
several other documents. These 
include a 2014 policy on consensual 
police-civilian encounters, a train-
ing document on constitutional law, 
and a 2011 revision of Rule 323, 
which governs the conduct and re-
porting of encounters with civilians. 
These documents do not solve the 
BPD’s stop-and-frisk problems.
For example, the 2011 revision to Rule 323 fails to 
instruct officers how to ensure that police encounters 
are not driven by race. It does not prohibit the use 
of race, ethnicity, or national origin to any degree in 
justifying a stop, frisk, or search. Nor does it clear-
ly require officers to document all stops, frisks, and 
searches. Rule 323 also fails to explain that a stop is 
impermissible unless officers identify specific, articu-
lable evidence supporting individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing. And finally, the rule does not identify the 
proper standard for conducting protective frisks—rea-
sonable suspicion that a person is armed and danger-
ous—and does not adequately guard against the use 
of coercion to obtain “consent.”
Similarly, the training document incorrectly states 
that stops are permitted based on factors such as 
“time of day” and “furtive gestures.” But those fac-
tors, standing alone, do not provide reasonable suspi-
cion for a stop. 
With respect to the ACLU’s request for updated 
data, the BPD has reported a 42% drop in the number 
of police-civilian encounters per year between 2010 
and 2013. Although this reduction is commendable, 
it does not mean that the BPD has ceased dispropor-
tionately targeting Boston’s communities of color, or 
that it has ceased using flimsy justifications to initiate 
encounters with civilians. 
To the contrary, because the BPD’s post-2010 poli-
cies evidently do not address the problems identified 
in June 2012 and March 2014, it is doubtful that those 
problems have been solved by the BPD’s post-2010 
practices. 
Accordingly, there remains cause for concern that 
BPD encounters with civilians, even if less frequent, 
are still deeply flawed. These con-
cerns are reinforced by interviews 
that the ACLU of Massachusetts 
has recently conducted in target-
ed communities. Time and again, 
people of color in Boston reported 
that police still target Black youth, 
not because they are committing 
crimes, but because of the color of 
their skin.
B. THE TIME FOR CHANGE IS NOW 
Boston has a new mayor and a new police commis-
sioner. These circumstances present a unique oppor-
tunity for Boston to adopt new and better approaches 
to Stop and Frisk. To transform an environment of 
discrimination and suspicion into one of trust and 
cooperation, we urge reforms that promote police 
Accountability, safeguard Constitutional rights, and 
create Transparency.
In short, the BPD needs to A.C.T.
Accountability
The BPD can manage only what it measures. The 
BPD should implement oversight that can quickly 
spot, address, and correct unconstitutional policing. 
After all, the best policies will not lead to improve-
ments in the streets unless the BPD ensures that 
officers follow them.
• All officers engaged in police-civilian encoun-
ters should wear and utilize body-worn cameras 
(BWCs) during every interaction with the public. 
Likewise, all BPD vehicles used in encounters 
with civilians should be equipped with dash-
board-mounted cameras (DMCs). 
 »Officers should immediately notify people that 
We should strive 
to make Boston 
a model to which 
other cities aspire.
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they are being recorded by a BWC.
 »The BPD should delete BWC or DMC video af-
ter two years unless a recording is “flagged” at 
the subject’s request or because it documents 
the use of force, or involves an encounter that 
is the subject of a complaint, or led to a deten-
tion or arrest. 
 »The BPD should permit individuals recorded 
by BWCs or DMCs to have access to and make 
copies of those recordings. This same permis-
sion should be available to a third party if the 
subject consents, or to criminal defense lawyers 
seeking relevant evidence.
• BPD officers should issue receipts to any-
one who is interrogated, stopped, frisked, or 
searched. 
 »The receipt should be issued no matter wheth-
er the encounter was consensual, and no mat-
ter whether the encounter resulted in an arrest 
or other legal action. 
 »The receipt should identify the officer(s) in-
volved, the time and place of the encounter, the 
legal basis for the encounter, and the means of 
filing a complaint with the BPD. 
 »The BPD should follow up appropriately on all 
complaints relating to civilian encounters. 
• The BPD should ensure that all officers com-
plete a FIOFS Report for every stop, frisk, or 
search, regardless of whether the subject con-
sented and regardless of the encounter’s out-
come. 
 »Supervisors should be required to promptly 
review FIOFS Reports and to take corrective 
action if an officer fails to complete them. 
 »The BPD should take corrective or disciplinary 
action if a supervisor fails to conduct complete, 
thorough, timely, and accurate reviews of the 
FIOFS Reports.
Constitutionality 
Of course, oversight will not work unless the officers 
conducting street encounters are actually trained to 
follow the Constitution. Thus, the BPD should im-
plement policies and training to ensure that officers 
conduct proper stops, frisks, and searches, without 
any influence by race, ethnicity, or national origin.
• The BPD should revise its stop, frisk, and 
search policies so that they require officers:
 »to have individualized, objective reasonable 
suspicion of specific criminal activity to conduct 
an investigatory stop;
 »to have individualized, objective reasonable 
suspicion that someone stopped is “armed and 
dangerous” before conducting a protective frisk 
for weapons;
 »to never rely in any way on real or perceived 
race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gen-
der, gender identity, disability status, or sexual 
orientation;
 »to refrain from conducting a consensual en-
counter, interrogation, frisk, or search until the 
officer affirmatively informs the individual of his 
or her right of refusal, and obtains prior written 
documentation of the subject’s consent; and 
 »to require substantial cadet and in-service 
training to all sworn officers on all revised FIOFS 
policies.
• The BPD should revise its training policies and 
FIOFS Report form to ensure that each Report:
 » identifies the individualized reasonable sus-
picion that led to the police-civilian encounter 
and each action taken during the encounter, 
including any frisks, searches, and uses of force; 
 »cautions officers against using boilerplate lan-
guage to articulate reasonable suspicion; 
 »documents whether each encounter was 
consensual and, if so, provides proof that the 
civilian’s consent was obtained in writing or 
through video-recording; and
 » indicates whether the encounter resulted in a 
summons, arrest, and/or seizure of weapons or 
contraband.
• The BPD should implement a bias-free policing 
policy that:
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 »prohibits using race, ethnicity, national origin, 
gender, age, religion, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or disability status to any extent in initi-
ating an encounter, stop, frisk, or search; 
 »requires substantial cadet and in-service train-
ing to all sworn officers on bias-free policing; 
and 
 »disciplines officers for violating the policy.
Transparency
Beyond improving oversight and training, the BPD 
should work to rebuild trust with communities who 
have been stigmatized, victimized, and marginalized 
by the BPD’s stop-and-frisk practices. That rebuilding 
is impossible so long as the BPD’s practices and data 
are secret. 
• The BPD should develop and implement a 
program to inform Bostonians about their right 
to a citizen-receipt following any police-civilian 
encounter and teaches them how to make police 
misconduct complaints.
• The BPD should, on a quarterly basis, analyze 
and publish data on all consensual or non-con-
sensual stops, frisks, searches, observations, and 
interviews. The published data should be broken 
down by race, gender, age, and the officer’s basis 
for the encounter or action.
• The BPD should annually publish its FIOFS-re-
lated directives and training materials. And, 
on a quarterly basis, the BPD should publish 
information about civilian complaints, including 
how many were received and how they were 
resolved.
VII. CONCLUSION
The information in this report places Boston at 
a crossroads. One road continues with business as 
usual, which has alienated communities and failed 
to ensure that police encounters are either just or 
effective. The other road leads to transparency, police 
accountability, and respect for the dignity and consti-
tutional rights of all Bostonians. 
All of us—the police, Bostonians, community 
groups, and others—should choose the second road. 
We should rededicate ourselves to making Boston a 
place of healthy and safe communities with justice for 
all. We should restore accountability, constitutionality, 
and transparency to police practices. And we should 
strive to make Boston a model to which other cities 
aspire. 
If we do that, Boston’s streets will be safer, its police 
department will be stronger, and the trust between 
its police officers and civilians will be more durable. 
Nearly 250 years after Boston was dubbed “the Cradle 
of Liberty,” it is time again to put that ideal into prac-
tice. ▪
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